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An exhibit of food and agriculture posters in the Special Collection of the National 
Agriculture Library will display posters from World Wars I and II side by side. What 
did these messages look like and how did they change over time? Public servants 
produced the earlier posters to reflect “reason-why” approaches to mass 
communication. During WWII, the Advertising Council’s business-minded admen, 
took over with their techniques for modern advertising and mass persuasion. Poster 
text shortened, the tone lightened and images were more frequent and splashier. This 
collection of posters bear witness to the professionalization and rising influence of the 
advertising industry in the 1920s and 30s, and reveals the agendas of the creators and 
their assumptions about homefront populations. The posters raise questions about the 
sources and ambitions of government sponsored messages designed to encourage 
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“All you gentlemen have to do is to induce the American people to change their ways 
of living — that’s all.”1 With this ironic remark, the chief of publicity of the Food 
Administration’s Educational Division reminded a conference of state educational 
directors in 1917 that their fundamental duty was to encourage Americans to modify 
their behavior on a grand scale during a time of war. The reminder also warned them 
the task would not be easy. In the 1910s, United States citizens valued “individual 
initiative” and the democracy they believed existed because of it. Yet, the Food 
Administration asked the American public — reluctant to enter a European war — to 
put the interests of the nation and the concerns of global events before their individual 
interests. They were asked to willingly adjust consumption habits by conserving food 
staples like wheat, meat and sugar. WWII agencies with similar goals, such as the 
War Food Administration and the Office of Price Administration, formed in 1941 
under different political circumstances, and with different rules and expectations from 
the public. For both wars, a combination of agencies produced publicity materials, 
including posters, in an attempt to capture the American public’s attention, and to 
encourage citizens to cooperate with their government and act in the interests of the 
nation. What did these messages look like? 
The planning of an exhibit of posters from World Wars I and II at the National 
Agriculture Library (NAL) is the starting point of this inquiry. The posters at NAL 
focus on food and agriculture in wartime, including issues related to food production, 
                                                 
1 John S. Pardee quoted by Maxcy Robson Dickson, The Food Front in World War I (Washington, 
D.C.: American Council of Public Affairs, 1944), 26. 
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farm management, food consumption, and other homefront behavior. The poster 
campaigns express seemingly similar intentions — to modify the daily behavior of 
large homefront populations. However, different political, economic and social 
environments shaped the government messages produced during the two wars. 
Through NAL’s poster collection, researchers can compare the visual information and 
propaganda campaigns from two time periods, in addition to poster production 
techniques and styles. This comparison reveals the agendas important to the authors 
of the posters when they were produced, and the way messages were communicated 
in times of war to a mass audience. And most of all, what they felt would work. 
While decorative at times, the mass-produced poster was a primary form of 
one-way communication in the late 1800’s and early 1900s — before radio and 
television guaranteed regular contact with the public. Like TV and radio, however, 
posters conveyed messages intended for a mass audience. They were designed to be 
easy and quick to understand, or at the very least, attention-grabbing. As the chairmen 
of the WWI propaganda agency explained, “I had the conviction that the poster must 
play a great part in the fight for public opinion. The printed word might not be read, 
people might not choose to attend meetings or to watch motion pictures, but the 
billboard was something that caught even the most indifferent eye.” 2 
                                                 




War Department Publicity Photo, 1917.  
Fatty Arbuckle, famous actor and comedian, 
photographed pasting up a Liberty Loan poster 
in Times Square, New York. This show of 
celebrity support would have been sent to 
newspapers by a government publicity office. 
The photograph illustrates how posters were 
displayed in urban spaces, and in what 
quantities.  
Photographer: Paul Thompson 
Source: American Unofficial Collection of 
World War I Photographs, 1917-1918, NARA, 
College Park. 
 
The changing styles of the war posters bear witness to the professionalization 
of the advertising industry in the US in the 1920s and 30s. Commercial advertisers, 
who formed the Advertising Council, staffed the non-commercial Office of War 
Information during WWII and produced most of the government’s posters during the 
later war. The posters present an opportunity to understand the messages and the 
agendas of the advertisers who produced them. Consequently, this research project is 
also an argument for using the posters and popular visual media as historical 
evidence.  
My guides are cultural observers who believe that public messages and 
popular media have consequences worthy of investigation — that they relay messages 
about society and how it functions. Public messages are capable of creating “a 
symbolic universe where certain cultural values are sanctioned and others are 
rendered marginal of invisible.”3 George Roeder contends, “It is impossible fully to 
understand twentieth-century events like World War II without careful attention to 
                                                 
3 T. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1994), 3. 
 3 
 
the role played by visual images in stirring and shaping public attitudes.”4 
Additionally, competing interests have influence over personal habits, especially 
consumption habits, which are never completely private; “they have public sources 
and public consequences.”5 During WWI, the public consequences of responsible, 
private behavior were often described in the text of a war poster, while similar posters 
from WWII usually opted to prioritize private gain. Why the change? 
By investigating posters as a form of one-way communication from above, I 
will examine the types of messages sent, the methods used to send them, and how the 
messages reflected the needs of war and the posters’ creators. What assumptions and 
agendas of the creators did the posters make visible? How did these agendas change 
over time? What do the posters reveal about strategies to induce the American people 




A comparison of canning posters reveals a particularly sharp divergence between 
homefront posters produced during WWI and II. During both wars, home canning 
was encouraged as a way to conserve food and avoid waste, especially of surplus 
garden produce. Canning was a popular, agreeable poster topic, which served as an 
excuse to promote reassuring images of women in the home and abundance on the 
homefront. When shown canning, a wartime homemaker was shown creating 
                                                 
4 George Roeder, The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 6. 
5 Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass 
Market (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 290-1. 
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something for later use, as opposed to going without, and businesses appreciated that 
canning posters did not instruct consumers to buy less of anything. In WWI, posters 
about canning emphasized war, allies, duty, thrift, and famine. A poster produced in 
New Hampshire warned, “The Situation is Critical. We must save THE FOOD 
SUPPLIES,” and declared, “Every woman who saves food is a patriotic soldier in the 
nation’s army” (fig. 2). Another asked women, “Help to feed our soldiers in France.” 
Others read, “Food Thrift—Your Patriotic Gift,” (Fig. 3) and “NOW is the TIME to 
DO YOUR BIT: Know Foods and Food Values” (fig. 4). Another WWI poster 
depicted a bright and colorful array of produce, but behind it was a woman in 
patriotic garb with a serious face and the text, “WIN THE NEXT WAR NOW”— a 
somber message to ponder when planning what to can for future use (fig. 5).  
In contrast, WWII canning posters created by the Ad Council depicted the 
smiling faces and carefree homemakers that had been featured in commercial 
advertising. In one poster, a cute young girl grinned at her attractive, blonde mother 
as she helped with a jar, and asked, “We’ll have lots to eat this winter, won’t we 
mother?” (fig. 6). In a poster created for the National Garden Program, a rosy-
cheeked woman with jars spilling out of her arms declared, “OF COURSE I CAN! 
I’m as patriotic as can be — and ration points won’t worry me!” (fig. 7). For another, 
canning was referenced enthusiastically: “IT’S A REAL WAR JOB!” (fig. 8). And 
yet another WWII poster depicted a smiling woman in overalls and a straw hat 
standing in front of impressively colorful jars of produce that were taller than her. 
With an outstretched arm as if she were a product model, she showed off the 
abundant jars and reminded other women, “Get your canning supplies now!” (fig. 9). 
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The WWII posters transformed somber messages about conservation, and a practical 
wartime activity, into an opportunity to worry less and consume more. How did this 
happen?  
Figure 2 
“The Situation is 
Critical. We must save 
THE FOOD 
SUPPLIES.” 
Public Safety Food 
Commission of New 
Hampshire with the 
County Farm Bureau, 
c.1917. 
Figure 3 
CAN ALL YOU CAN 
Food Thrift—Your 
Patriotic Gift. 
National War Garden 
Commission, c. 1917. 
Figure 4 
Women of the Home 
NOW is the TIME to 
DO YOUR BIT 
Know Foods and 
Food Values. 
The PA State College 




Win the Next War 
Now. 
National War Garden 




“We’ll have lots to eat 
this winter, won’t we 
mother?” 
United States. Office of 
War Information.  
Division of Public 
Inquiries, 1943. 
Source: Posters, World 
War II,  
UNT Catalog b2850376 
Figure7 
“Of Course I Can! I’m 
as patriotic as can be—
And ration points won’t 
worry me!” 
Dick Williams, artist. 
National Garden 
Program. USDA, 1946. 
 
Figure 8 
CAN ALL YOU 
CAN 












While the strategies of mass persuasion and poster design had visibly changed 
between the wars, figures 2–9 highlight a striking consistency among the canning 
posters. Posters from both wars addressed women as similar, and in many cases, as 
unchanging. Despite public discussion and apprehension over women’s entry into the 
wartime workforce, which placed women in a production role, posters almost always 
depicted women in traditionally acceptable scenarios as consumers and caretakers, in 
the home, with food, and later, shopping patriotically within the guidelines of 
rationing. Women depicted in traditional roles served as symbols of stability, and 
delegated women as the “guardians of a way of life temporarily disrupted by 
uncertainty, violence, and prolonged separation from loved ones.”6 Some posters did 
recruit women for war work outside of the home, but in general, war was no time to 
publicize expanded roles for women. Advertisers and government administrators 
consistently promoted a mainstream, non-threatening set of assumptions “a way to 
make sense of the tumultuous times; it fed the hope that once the war was over 
society could be restored to its previous order.”7 By reinforcing gender norms in 
popular media, the homefront adopted a feminine persona, since the “real” front was 
unquestionably masculine.8 Such clear distinctions provided government 
administrators and advertisers with a defined homefront audience for whom clear 
messages could be created and disseminated during both wartimes. 
Wartime food conservation and rationing functioned simultaneously to elevate 
women’s status and to maintain gender hierarchies. In WWII, by taking the Home 
                                                 
6 Maureen Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda During World War II 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 132. 
7 Amy Bently, Eating for Victory: Food Rationing and the Politics of Food Rationing (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1998), 6. 
8 Ibid, 44. 
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Front Pledge to “use ration points in full” and “pay no more than ceiling prices,” 
women not only swore to make food matters part of their war zone, contends 
historian Amy Bently, but they also “implicitly acknowledged that food matters were 
women’s work.”9 For the previous war effort, Hoover clearly referred to women’s 
work in 1917 when he announced, “There is no royal road to food conservation.” He 
continued, “It can be accomplished only though sincere and earnest daily cooperation 
in the 20,000,000 kitchens and at the 20,000,000 dinner tables of the United States.”10 
In other words, conserving food would be an unglamorous, daily effort performed by 
those who spent time preparing and serving food. For the later war, OWI’s head 
administrator, Elmer Davis admitted, “There is no question of the general willingness 
to do the obvious things, the spectacular things; but plenty of people are going to have 
to do dull and drab and uninteresting work besides, if we are to win the war.”11 Since 
men got to do the spectacular things, metaphorical war language was usually invoked 
to bestow wartime importance to women’s work, and it often revealed patronizing 
undertones. Declaring kitchens as battle stations or canning as “A REAL WAR 
JOB!” (fig. 8) enabled media to adhere to mainstream assumptions about the 
appropriateness of certain types of work for women. If cooking and shopping were 
patriotic acts, then homefront contributions could be kept within the status quo of 
consumerism and consumption. This sentiment existed between the wars, too. During 
the National Recovery Administration’s Blue Eagle campaign, female shoppers 
                                                 
9 Bently, 38. 
10 Hoover quoted by Maxcy Robson Dickson, The Food Front in World War I (Washington, D.C.: 
American Council of Public Affairs, 1944), 22. 
11 Elmer Davis, “War Information,” War Information and Censorship. Washington, D.C.: American 




specifically had been encouraged by General Hugh Johnson, director of the NRA 
publicity campaign, to shop only at stores displaying a Blue Eagle logo. “It is women 
in homes and not soldiers in uniforms who will this time save our country from 
misery and discord…It is zero hour for housewives. Their battle cry is ‘Buy Now 
under the Blue Eagle.’”12 At least one female voice, Susan B. Anthony II, suggested 
an alternative battle cry for women during WWII, and argued, “The actual Key to 
Victory in this war in the extrication of women — all women — from the relative 
unproductively of the kitchen, and the enrolling of them in the high productivity of 
factory, office and field.” In her book, Out of the Kitchen—Into War, she criticized 
private interests and the homefront expectations placed on women: 
Lurking behind the nutrition posters, the committees and conferences, [is] the 
hoary notion that in the solemn business of winning a war women’s chief 
contribution should come through more hours of shopping and more 
conversation about food, meat cuts, vegetables and vitamins….from the point 
of view of serious women’s work the suggested confining of womanpower to 
the monotonies of nutrition seems about as enlightened as limiting them to 
knitting. Able-bodied women [are] exhorted as a primary war aim to 
“prepare adequate meals for your own families and reform your own 
families’ poor food habits.” Women’s time is expendable — that was the 
only conclusion you [could] come to.13 
 
Anthony’s ideas could not compete with advertisers, politicians and other women. 
Too many parties had invested in what the homefront kitchen symbolized. According 
to Bently, minimizing women’s kitchen duties would have undermined WWII’s 
“prevailing wartime politics of sacrifice, which promised citizens that the American 
emphasis on private consumption need not be relinquished in the name of the war 
                                                 
12 General Hugh Johnson quoted by Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in 
Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 111. 
13 Susan B. Anthony II, Out of the Kitchen—Into War: Women’s Winning Role in the Nation’s Drama 
(New York: Stephen Day, 1943), 5, 43-44. 
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effort.”14 Assumptions about the roles of women on the homefront may have stayed 
the same, as posters from both wars show, but other features changed dramatically — 
the posters look different and communicate differently. 
The WWI posters are somber, rational and serious. They reflect the urgent 
tone of a United States government entering into major international conflict for the 
first time, and in need of unprecedented citizen cooperation. Passage of the Lever Act 
on August 10, 1917, and the creation of the United States Food Administration, 
exemplifies the expanded emergency powers President Woodrow Wilson believed he 
needed after the US entered World War I in April 1917.15 He recognized the need for 
a government agency to coordinate a food conservation campaign and to allow the 
US to continue to send food to allies while preventing inflation, hording and 
shortages at home. He wanted to grant the Food Administration power to control food 
supplies, distribution, and pricing, which meant unprecedented government 
intervention in the market to purchase and distribute foodstuffs, and if necessary, to 
impose rationing. Aware of the American public’s traditional suspicions of 
authoritarian government, Wilson emphasized democracy and freedom when he 
appointed Herbert Hoover as Food Administrator on May 19, 1917: “The successful 
conduct of the food administration… will be the finest possible demonstration of the 
willingness, the ability, and the efficiency of democracy, and of its justified reliance 
upon the freedom of individual initiative.”16 Wilson’s reference to public 
                                                 
14 Bently, 42. 
15 The bill was passed, and the Food Administration was established, on Hoover’s 43rd birthday. See 
George Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies 1917-1918 (New York, W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1996), 71. 
16 Woodrow Wilson, statement on the Lever Bill, quoted in New York Times, May 20, 1917, section 1, 
p. 1, cited by Nash, 24. 
 10 
 
volunteerism — the “willingness” — underscored a national reverence for business-
minded efficiency and a libertarian spirit, which many believed constituted the core 
values of a strong democracy. Government administrators had been traditionally 
hesitant to interfere in the “freedom of individual initiative” or in the economic 
matters of private business. They understood their public role as administrative only. 
Unsurprisingly, a few members of Congress strongly objected to granting 
unprecedented power to war agencies like the Food Administration, even when the 
public supported it. Opponents feared the proposed control of profits and a 
“revamping of the economic order” of the country. Supporters pointed to the 
“oppressive price of food” and “the violence of starving thousands” in Europe.17   
Herbert Hoover actually shared the fears of those opposed to centralizing so 
much economic and regulatory power. He rarely used the Food Administration’s 
power to fine businesses or to regulate private industry. He emphasized cooperation 
and rejected the need to force Americans to do anything. Like other government 
administrators hired for the war effort, Hoover believed his job was to educate and 
inform rational, cooperative citizens. A rational citizenry could be trusted to arrive at 
sound conclusions regarding matters of principle. Similarly, the Committee on Public 
Information’s (CPI) approach to wartime propaganda “was educational and 
informative throughout,” explained chairman, George Creel, “for we had such 
confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, 
straightforward presentation of facts.” 18 These administrators had tied their belief in a 
rational citizenry to a belief that the United States was manifestly superior to the 
                                                 
17Nash, 45-6. 
18 Creel, 4-5. 
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oppressive Central Powers who kept their people “in darkness and delusion.”19 
Following this logic, Hoover believed voluntary instead of mandatory rationing 
proved that the Food Administration did not contradict American democratic ideals. 
In fact, it embodied them: “There is no dictatorship in volunteer effort. It is by 
voluntary mobilization that we can answer autocracy with democracy.”20 Wheatless 
and meatless days were merely suggestions, but they were made popular through the 
use of slogans, pledge cards and visual propaganda — techniques borrowed, writes 
historian Harvey Levenstein, from the incongruous combination of the prohibition 
movement and the fledgling advertising industry.21 The Food Administration’s 
posters spelled out recommended changes to homefront diets (fig. 10).  
    
Figure 10 
Two US Food Administration posters, c. 1917. 
 
During WWII, most of the government’s war messages passed through the 
hands of the professional admen, who replaced somber government slogans with 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 4. 
20 Herbert Hoover quoted by Jacobs, Pocketbook Politic, 58. 
21 Harvey Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 138. 
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images and text reminiscent of 1940s advertising, as the WWII canning posters 
demonstrate. Ad men worked directly for the Office of War information OWI after 
they formed the War Advertising Council in June of 1942. Composed of corporate 
advertisers and advertising agencies, the Council became a “private vehicle for public 
information and persuasion.”22 Just as private businesses were learning they could not 
function without the assistance of the government and the stability and continuity it 
provided, the ad men reluctantly agreed to donate ad space and their work time to 
produce publicity materials and war posters. To convince them to help Roosevelt’s 
New Deal administration, government official explained, “the position of companies 
after the war, whether high or low, depend[ed] on their contributions to winning the 
war.”23 Later, the Ad Council’s Chairman agreed that for transmitting information, 
advertising, more than newspapers, magazines, and radio, was “the most effective 
because it [was] the most direct.”24 By 1943, a Time magazine article, “Advertising in 
the War,” purported that advertising had reached “new high standards.” and gushed, 
“Advertisers, like other human beings, are inherently patriotic and sensible. 
Inevitably they saw the nation’s real needs — strong morale, capacity production, 
patriotic sacrifice — and began to shape their advertising to fit it.” Back in the office, 
however, advertisers wanted to ensure that businesses would be around after war to 
hire them. Hey also recognized the opportunity to improve their public image which 
had been tarnished in the 1920s and 30s when promoting free enterprise had become 
a central tenet of their profession. They believed their trade was more valuable to 
                                                 
22 Robert Griffith, “The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942-
1960,” The Business History Review 57, n. 3 (Autumn, 1983): 391. 
23 Fox, 48. 
24 No author listed, “Advertising in the War,” Time Magazine, 22 March 1943. 
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businesses engaged in a free market, and that free enterprise was integral to a 
functioning economy, a democratic society, and to their survival. Consequently, when 
examining WWII posters, the motivations of the creators borrowed from private 
industry become enormously significant. Posters were used to sell war, ask for 
cooperation, and to inform the public. But they were also used to sell other ideas, 
especially socio-economic ones held dear by the sellers. Advertisers not only 
influenced government methods of communication, but by WWII, they were the 
government’s communicators.  
By the time the Ad Council started producing materials for the government, 
consumer purchasing power was a preoccupation of consumers, advertisers, 
businessmen and politicians alike. President Franklin Roosevelt referenced consumer 
purchasing power when he delivered a “Cost of Living” message to Congress on 
April 27, 1942, and declared a need for mandatory rationing on the homefront. “It is 
obviously fair that where there is not enough of any essential commodity to meet all 
civilian demands, those who can afford to pay more for the commodity should not be 
privileged over those who cannot. …where any important article becomes scarce, 
rationing is the democratic, equitable solution.25 Fearing the spread of false rumors 
about rationing, Elmer Davis, the director of OWI, gave U.S. consumers two months 
warning before expanded food rationing took affect in 1943. Working with the Office 
of Price Administration (OPA), who had been given authority to enforce rationing, 
rent control and price control, Davis emphasized necessity, facts, participation and 
fairness in his December radio address, “Rationing and the War.” After explaining the 
many pressures on the food supply and why the laws of supply and demand under the 
                                                 
25 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Cost of Living” message to Congress, April 27, 1942, quoted by Bently, 14. 
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circumstances would give some people an unfair advantage, Davis reassured that 
while rationing may be a nuisance, “it is the best way anybody has yet been able to 
figure out to make sure that what we have is fairly passed around.”26 In fact, OPA 
officials had worried that savvy advertisers would play on consumer fears of 
shortages, which led them to doubt the effectiveness of voluntary rationing without 
government restrictions.27 As one OPA document put it, “The natural reaction of 
American citizens when rumors of threatened shortages reach their ears is to rush to 
buy. Rumors of rationing, of limitation orders, and even of style restrictions have 
been used in the trade to promote sales and have provided incentives for buying 
sprees by the public.”28 Public officials readily promoted the importance of fairness 
and purchasing power at a time of war, and they hoped to enlist the power of 
advertising to influence homefront behavior. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had already embraced consumer language during in his 
1932 campaign for president, when he proposed that the government assure “well 
distributed” purchasing power “throughout every group in the nation.”29 One year 
earlier, when Governor Roosevelt addressed the New York chapter of the Advertising 
Federation of America, he called attention to the untapped powers of advertising: 
“National advertising had been educating us for prosperity…now its great and 
necessary powers should be applied to government.” He asked the ad men to “Help us 
to interest people in the machinery and production of government.”30 Roosevelt 
                                                 
26 Elmer Davis, “Rationing and the War,” Radio address reprint, OWI, December 27, 1942. 
27 Bently, 21. 
28 “OPA Policy Statement on Rationing Presented to the Office of Economic Stabilization, November 
25, 1942,” in Ayers Brinser, “History of the Administration of Rationing in the United States During 
the Second World War,” 
29 Franklin D. Roosevelt quoted by Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 104. 
30 Lears, 243. 
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recognized the usefulness of adopting consumer’s language for political ends. He did 
not fear government solutions to the country’s social and economic problems as 
advertisers did, but he seemed to share one common assumption with them: the 
American public was a mass audience to be persuaded.31 
Advertising agencies and their clients began to view the mass audience as “the 
prize in the struggle between American Business and Big Government.”32 In 
November of 1929, the President of the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies suggested that since the damage inflicted by the stock market crash was 
primarily psychological, advertising, “with its power to sway the public, was best 
prepared to deal with such a ‘mere state of mind.’ ”33 In this way, the Depression 
exposed the relentlessness of advertisers and their drive to promote businesses’ 
interests regardless of the public’s actual needs, which increased for many during the 
Depression. In 1930, when business leaders and politicians came up with the “Buy 
Now” campaign, the Journal of Commerce observed, “The consumer is being asked 
to buy more of everything at a time when he is often unable to pay for pressing 
immediate necessities. …Slogans can not bring about revival.”34 Not only did the 
campaign not bring revival, but by the spring of 1931, businesses began to cut wages 
and purchasing power declined. Shortly thereafter, social reformers, labor leaders, 
and economic thinkers turned to the government and away from business for 
leadership. President Hoover urged businesses to maintain wage levels to prevent an 
even greater loss of consumer demand. Many leaders now recognized the important 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 286. 
34 Business Week, cited by Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 96. 
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role of the worker — as a consumer. Business Week reported that instead of merely a 
production cost, businessmen have begun to “look upon the labor more as a consumer 
of mass production.”35 But even those who had jobs saw their income fall. Many 
social reformers had already argued that the worker’s and consumer’s interests were 
linked. For them, The Depression had proved the consumer was “powerless in the 
face of manipulative advertising, mass technology, and a maldistribution of 
income.”36 Reformers called for a drastic overhauling of government’s control of 
business, which businessmen and their advertisers believed would have a negative 
affect on their ability to operate freely. 
To the dismay of business, government price controls during WWII signaled a 
growing regulatory state and encouraged popular participation and mobilization. 
According to historian Meg Jacobs, the OPA served as a “radical model of state 
management: a popular government agency working in alliance with a labor, 
consumer, social liberal coalition that challenged the right of private industries to set 
their own prices and sell their items freely.”37 Among the 30 million consumers OPA 
affected in the most “minute economic decisions,” many recognized the benefits of 
price controls and OPA enjoyed popular support. It mobilized and relied on thousands 
of mostly female volunteer price-checkers, whose housewife and consumer statuses 
had earned new legitimacy and a national purpose. They reported dishonest pricing, 
decline in product quality or skimping on contents. They argued for product grading 
                                                 
35 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 98. 
36 Ibid, 100. 
Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1951), appendix A, xx. 
37 Meg Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?’: The Office of Price Administration, Consumption Politics, 
and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946,” The Journal of American History 84, No. 3 
(Dec., 1997): 911-912. 
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and price lists that women could carry with them while shopping. In short, OPA 
empowered women to ask for information that would enable them to be smart, 
discerning consumers. One administrator referred to OPA as “democracy in action.”38 
The agency’s Consumer Advisory Committee reported that housewives “not only 
accepted rationing as necessary, but have been glad for the assurance it has given 
them.”39 By legitimizing consumer interests, this agency had also heightened 
business fears of government regulation. Mass media and posters created during 
WWII often made these fears visible. The simple message of an Ad Council poster 
about carrying packages and conserving trucks and tires was eclipsed by the depictio
of a woman shopping and filling her arms with goods she could purchase in a 
freedom-loving, capitalistic society (fig. 12). When contrasted with a WWI poster 
conveying a similar request (fig. 11), and a conspicuous reference to “THE 
GOVERNMENT,” the Ad Council’s poster appears to obfuscate an otherwise clear




                                                 
38 Chester Bowles, quoted by Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?’: The Office of Price Administration, 
Consumption Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946,” 925. 
39 Judith Russell and Renee Fantin, Studies in Food Rationing (Washington, D.C.: Office of 





Women, The Government Asks You, Will 
YOU? Carry Your Own Packages, 
Reduce Deliveries, Step In and Sign For 
YOUR War Service, Make the Parcel in 
the Hand a Badge of Honor. 
Women’s Committee, Michigan Division 




I’ll carry mine too! 
Photographer: Valentino Sarra, for Emergency 
Management Office, War Information Office. 
1943. Source: University of North Texas, Rare 




In the decades leading up to WWI, many public officials were as fearful of an 
expanded government as businesses were. Hoover knew his Food Administration 
would be perceived as intrusive and he proceeded cautiously by insisting on a 
volunteer-only effort and by disseminating information widely to regional offices and 
agencies. Every state had its own food controller and local volunteers. Hoover 
believed these local, more personal levels of government could achieve citizen 
cooperation in ways his newly formed federal agency could not. “We must centralize 
ideas but decentralize execution.”40 Instead of sending strict orders down to the 
states, the Food Administration’s Educational Division disseminated guidanc
recommended messages to State Educational Directors and State Food 
e and 
                                                 
40 Herbert Hoover quoted by Walton Rawls, Wake Up, America! World War I and the American Poster 
(New York: Abbevile Press, 1988), 113.  
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Administrators. The Educational Division was run by Ben S. Allen, whom Hoover 
had recruited from the London bureau of the Associated Press.41 His division had 
been divided into narrower sections with titles that reflected various strategies and 
media outlets: Publications, Illustrations and Plate, States Publicity, Copy Desk, Press 
Clipping, Library and Exhibition, Magazine and Feature, Farm Journals, Trade and 
Technical Journals, Religious Press, Negro Press, Retail Stores, Advertising and 
Motion Pictures.42 State Councils of Defense and agricultural Extension Services 
recruited volunteers to display messages in churches, schools, rural feed stores, post 
offices, train stations, clubs and other public places; they also produced their own 
posters, traveling speaker series, slide shows, and state fair exhibits.43 Disseminating 
messages this way helped to diminish fears of an oppressive food dictatorship, and 
produced many unique state interpretations, as the posters will show.  
When the states produced their own posters, they often incorporated more 
insistent, more authoritarian language than Hoover would have allowed in the FA’s 
national campaigns. The poster in figure 11, for example, produced in Michigan, 
emphasized “THE GOVERNMENT” even though Hoover consciously attempted to 
minimize centralized commandments directed at homefront citizens. A poster created 
by Arizona’s state council of defense invoked the autocracy versus democracy 
dichotomy by stating, “The German government would make you feed yourself. 
Uncle Sam wants you to feed yourself” (fig. 13). The poster followed with, “Do you 
appreciate liberty? Then show it by growing a garden.” The war bread poster from 
Kansas concluded that “First in war bread” meant “First in peace,” and that “Waste of 
                                                 
41 Dickson, 26. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 26-32. 
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food is disloyalty” (fig. 22). A poster from Oklahoma demanded to know, “Is your 
home harboring and feeding German Allies?” Then proclaimed, “All insects which 
destroy garden crops are German Allies,” and provided detailed instructions about 
how to “declare war on insects” (fig. 14). In Iowa, posters implored farmers, “Help 
Uncle Sam: Put your Corn in a Silo,” and grabbed attention with the text, “Your 
Country Calls” (figs. 15 and 16). Hoover may have been weary of citizen’s loyalty 
toward centralized government, but for some constituencies, the US government was 
a valid rationale for a call to action.  
 
 
Figure 13  
The German 
Government 
Would Make You 
Feed Yourself. 
 
Arizona Council of 




Figure 14  
German Allies 










Help Uncle Sam: 
Put Your Corn in a 
Silo. 
 
Iowa State Council 
of Defense, c.1917. 
 
 
Figure 16  
Your Country 
Calls: Save Food 







Appeals to rational citizens used in WWI posters echoed the “reason-why” 
style of advertising used in commercial advertising at that time. Through their 
“convincing” prose, advertisers provided the consumer with reasoned justifications 
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for their smart purchase.44 An illustration or use of bolded type may have captured 
one’s attention, but ultimately, images led the viewer to the rational argument in the 
copy. In a similar way, war posters justified requests for changes in homefront 
behavior with explanations and reasons why. The Food Administration poster, titled, 
“Why is it necessary to eat less meat and wheat bread?” answered the title question 
with approximately 14 detailed paragraphs, methodically explaining, “What the food 
situation is” (fig. 17). Even when the copy was kept brief, rationale was still 
provided: an illustrative Food Administration poster, followed the request, “Eat less 
wheat, meat, sugar and fat,” with the reasonable, “To save for the army and our 
allies” (fig.18). The regular adherence to this style of informative mass 
communication, for commercial and governmental messages alike, suggests a 
commonly held belief in the 1910s that the best method of persuading the public was 
achieved by supplying detailed facts, logical explanation and reasoned evidence. It 
also reveals how government publicity officials looked toward popular media and 
commercial advertisers for guidance about how to reach the public.  
                                                 
44 Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity 1920-1940 





Why Is It Necessary to Eat Less Meat and 
Less Wheat Bread?  
US Food Administration, 1917. 
Figure 18 
EAT MORE, EAT LESS To Save for the 
Army and Our Allies.  
US Food Administration, 1917. 
 
 
Some rational WWI posters exaggerated their rational appeals by illustrating 
the early twentieth-century admiration for scientific reasoning and bureaucratic 
methods of tackling problems. These posters employed a chart-like logic to encourage 
new habits, especially eating habits. When deciding the best method of convincing 
the public to adhere to Food Administration guidelines, the agency consulted modern 
home economists who supported a scientific approach to food. The economists 
advised the “wheatless” and “meatless” days, believing that “if Americans could be 
taught about interchangeability of proteins, fats, and carbohydrates,” they could be 
persuaded to adopt the concept of substitution.45 Consequently, when USDA posters 
suggested consuming specific foods, they often depicted unnecessary charts and 
chart-like illustrations as a way to suggest the rationality of the food substitution 
                                                 
45Harvey Levenstein, Revolution at the Table, 138. 
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requested. Text of one USDA poster stated matter-of-factly, “Eat more cottage 
cheese, you’ll need less meat.” Next to images of five varieties of meat producing 
animals, the poster produced a black and white photograph of a pile of cottage cheese, 
a series of red diagrammatic lines with arrows, and an explanation that one pound of 
cottage cheese supplied more protein than the animal derived protein sources (fig. 
19). This poster’s scientific approach to foodstuffs purposely disregarded the cultural 
or emotional factors that influence food choices; it was created in an age “that 
assumed an automatic connection between accurate data and rational action.”46 Using 
a similar approach, other posters described corn and potatoes as “palatable and 
nutritious” substitutes for wheat (fig. 20 and 21), and another depicted two large loafs 
of bread — exactly the foodstuff the poster asked consumers to eat less of — as a 
way to methodically diagram “the loaf that must win the war.” The bread illustration 
cleverly indicated, with a knife cutting the bread, the larger amount of wheat needed 
by the allies, and thus, the smaller percentage of wheat Americans should consume. If 
wheat is not conserved, the poster explained, “Democracy is doomed,” and then 
added, “Personal sacrifice must supplant previous extravagance” (fig. 22).  
                                                 






   
Figure 19 
Eat More Cottage Cheese, 
You’ll Need Less Meat. USDA, 
c. 1917. 
Figure 20 
Build Your Meals Around Potatoes and Have you Eaten 
Your Pound of Potatoes Today? USDA, c. 1917. 
  
Figure 21 
Eat More Corn. USDA, c.1917. 
Figure 22 
First in War Bread First in Peace. Kansas State Council of 
Defense and Home Economics, c. 1917. 
 
State agricultural colleges and bureaus produced posters during WWI aimed at 
rational citizen-farmers. These posters were heavy with text, and devoted significant 
space to practical, regional-specific information including practical advice about what 
to plant and when. In 1917, independent farmers grew livestock and crops all over the 
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country by responding to specific landscapes, growing seasons, weather conditions 
and the perceived market. Although the USDA had formed in 1862, the agency’s 
ability to collect data about farm output, or to predict production on a national scale, 
had not formalized until after WWI with the creation of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics in 1922.47 Consequently, farmers during WWI had not yet embraced the 
“industrial ideal” that encouraged more uniform, more business-like farming 
practices.48 During WWI, the USDA relied on state agriculture administrators and 
extension agents, knowledgeable of their regions, to create wartime messages and to 
address crop, dairy, and poultry farmers with specific, practical information useful for 
their day-to-day operations. These posters often reveal regional growing abilities, 
seasonal expectations, and distinct populations who farmed. Posters from North 
Carolina addressed “Negro Farmers” and “Patriotic Colored Men and Women” 
specifically (fig. 23). A poster from Connecticut explained why rye is a “Safe, sane 
and sensible crop for Connecticut” (fig. 24). Florida’s farmers were encouraged to 
grow native grasses and forage crops including sorghum, cowpeas, peanut hay and 
beggarweed (fig. 25). Mississippi’s farmers were instructed to “Grow all the corn you 
can in March,” and in Nebraska, “Plant the wheat with a drill to insure better 
germinization and to economize on seed” (fig. 26 and 27). This level of specificity, 
Hoover would have agreed, enabled messages to be more meaningful to the 
specialized audience, and thus, more likely to influence their behavior. 
                                                 
47 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 35.  





Figure 23  
Attention Negro 
Farmers! 
+ Work to Win 
the War. 
 




























Figure 26  
Mississippi 
Must Grow 






College and the 
States Relations 














In contrast, NAL’s poster collection does not contain any state-produced 
posters from WWII. During WWII, the Ad Council focused their efforts on national 
poster campaigns and general messages designed to reach large segments of the 
population. Information in the posters, if there was any, was less specific than WWI 
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posters and certainly not regionally-specific. The generic quality of many of their war 
posters reflected advertisers’ desire to reach who they believed was their largest, most 
desirable audiences, and to not offend. This strategy typically ignored many 
populations, including all minorities, working women and populations who still 
farmed. In this way, as one critic asserts, advertising “explains everything in its own 
terms…. It interprets the world as essentially eventless…made homogeneous, 
simplified.”49 In a time of war, when national unity was particularly desirable, 
advertisers defended their understanding of the public’s temperament and the need to 
perpetuate mainstream desires and beliefs with common symbols, myths and 
sentiments. The commercial illustrator, Norman Rockwell, mastered the ability to 
capture the hearts and minds of the public when he illustrated Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms speech in a series of paintings with same the title. As soon as OWI 
recognized how his paintings resonated with the public, they used the series in posters 
and as a theme for promoting the 1943 nation-wide war-bond drive.50 Although the 
paintings were not devised or created by ad men, Rockwell’s paintings functioned 
like advertising by depicting idealized scenes of American citizens instead of the 
harsh realities of war. Unlike advertising, however, he realized Roosevelt’s speech 
with depictions of humble citizens exercising intangible freedoms unrelated to free 
enterprise or consumerism.  
                                                 
49 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London: British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin Books, 1972), 
153-4. 
50 Stuart Murray and James McCabe, Norman Rockwell’s Four Freedoms: Images That Inspire a Nation 





Artist: Norman Rockwell 
OWI poster no. 45, 1943. 
Since many of Rockwell’s neighbors, who served as his 
models, were farmers, it is very likely the turkey was not a 
purchased item (and should not be read as a sign of overt 
consumerism), but was raised by the couple standing at the 
head of the table.51  
 
State produced posters from WWI attempted to encourage general, patriotic 
sentiments, too, but they had been created within the “reason-why” framework used 
in the earliest decade of the 20th-Century.  The frequent use of only two colors in 
regionally produced state posters from WWI, for example, often blue and red inks, 
suggest limitations of two-color printing for most local poster productions. But these 
ink choices also highlight obvious appeals to patriotism. Patriotic elements functioned 
as the primary decorative or design element in these posters containing few, if any, 
images. Many of the state posters relied on text to persuade the audience, as many 
WWI posters have shown. The messages emphasized duty, sacrifice and patriotism in 
a time of war, and encouraged citizens to think of their individual efforts as directly 
linked the nation’s interests, like the canning poster in figure 2, in which women’s 
thriftiness was their “patriotic gift.” According to figure 11,  dutifully carrying 
packages “released men and equipment for war service,” and was a way for women to 
symbolically “sign up” for their “war service,” and in figure 22, production of food 
meant “National Service.” Some WWI posters used the language of a military to 
equate homefront and farm front efforts with the actual military on the front lines.  
                                                 
51 Ibid., see Introduction and Chapter 1. 
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A poster from Michigan asked farmers to “Enlist! [in] Michigan’s Bean Brigade,” 
and insisted that “Beans are more important than bullets in this war” (fig. 29). Posters 
aimed at Georgia farmers claimed, “Beans are bullets and potatoes are powder,” and 
that “The man behind the plow is as important as the man behind the gun” (fig. 30). A 
Missouri poster asked farmers to “Join the army of food producers” (fig. 31), while in 
North Carolina, “An Army of Poultry Will Help Win the War” (fig. 32). A Kansas 
poster declared that “To feed the nation is to fight its battles,” suggested a “Plan of 
Attack,” and added gratuitously, “A Kansas soldier never sleeps at his post whether 
serving in the trenches or in the furrows” (fig. 33). In an illustration on a poster from 
Iowa, a farmer in overalls stands before his volunteers and receives a command from 
an army general. The general, pointing to a depiction of “The Hunger of the World,” 
tells the saluting farmer, “Your division will attack at once” (fig. 34). A poster from 
Texas used a cartoon to suggest that farmers “invest in a few hens” as a way to 
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More Food this 
Year is 
Patriotism. An 
Army of Poultry 











Feed a Nation is to 









Iowa, c. 1917 
 
Figure 35 
Let the Hen Whip 
the Kaiser! 
By Increasing the 
Food Supply 







Food Administration posters created for wider, national distribution in WWI 
were typically printed using more colors, and like WWII posters, they incorporated 
striking illustrations by professional artists and devoted less space to practical 
information. Yet, unlike WWII posters, they still echoed the “reason-why” approach 
to mass communication and used informative text to reference dire circumstances 
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abroad and to persuade a mass audience that wartime sacrifices were necessary. The 
richly illustrated posters focused on broadly relatable issues like food conservation 
and home gardens, and appealed to the moral, religious, and patriotic convictions 
shared by most Americans at this time. Just as the poster in figure 11 appealed to 
honor when it asked women to “Make the parcel in the hand a badge of honor,” these 
posters did more than instruct citizens to “eat less” and “waste nothing,” they also 
instructed them to “be thankful,” “be patriotic” and “sign your country’s pledge.” 
Though colorful, the illustrations depicted somber faces that reflected the seriousness 
of war and famine. The text matched the tone of the images and pleaded for an 
understanding of how individual actions were tied to bigger, global circumstances. A 
poster aimed at recent immigrants implored, “You came here seeking freedom, you 
must now help to preserve it: Wheat is needed for the allies. Waste nothing” (fig. 36).  
Other FA posters linked homefront behavior to the welfare of “those who fight for 
freedom,” the “millions of women and children behind our lines,” and the women of 







Figures 36, 37, 38 and 39  
Examples of WWI Food Administration posters. Educational Division. Advertising Section.  
Source: NARA, Still Pictures Records Section, Special Media Archives, College Park, MD.  
 
WWI posters incorporated the phrase “do your share,” “do your bit,” or “Your 
country calls,” as a way to spread a sense of duty and shared responsibility. A USDA 
poster described canning as “a vital necessity under war conditions,” but not strictly 
for selfish reasons, it also suggested, “Make saving, rather than spending, your social 
standard” (fig. 40). During WWI, posters spread the message that citizens were 
expected to contribute to the larger effort, the responsibility belonged to everyone, 
and the need was great. Posters aimed at younger audiences retained the same overall 
tone and encouraged shared responsibility for citizens of all ages. Posters asked 
children to “enlist” in the School Garden Army (fig. 41), and suggested to young 
gardeners, “We eat because we work,” and others referred to war explicitly (fig. 42). 
Children reading a recruitment poster for sheep clubs learned that “Twenty sheep 
[were needed] to equip and clothe each soldier” (fig. 43) A poster in Connecticut told 
Junior Agricultural Volunteers that “Soldiers must be fed and you should do your 





Help Feed Yourself. 
 Somebody Has to Raise or 
Pack Everything You Eat, 
Do your Share! Make 
Saving Rather than 
Spending Your Social 
Standard. USDA, c. 1917. 
Figure 41 
Join the United States Garden 
School Army, ENLIST NOW. 
 
Bureau of Education, Department 
of Interior, c. 1917. 
Figure 42 
We Eat because we Work. 
We belong to the U.S. School 
Garden Army. 
Bureau of Education, 





Twenty sheep to equip and 
clothe each soldier, Boys 
and girls can help, Join a 
sheep club.  
USDA, c. 1917. 
Figure 44 
The War at Home. 
School Boys of Connecticut: Help 
the farmers with the harvest! 
Soldiers must be fed and you 
should do your share. 
Connecticut State Council of 
Defense, c. 1917. 
 
 
During WWI, George Creel was convinced that an advertiser’s goal — to 
persuade and influence the behavior of a mass audience — paralleled his own as 
Chairman of the Committee for Public Information (CPI). In his 1920 memoir, he 
referred to CPI as “the world’s greatest adventure in advertising,” and even titled the 
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autobiographical account, How We Advertised America.52 According to Creel, 
advertisers helped CPI reach more of the public by connecting his office to artists and 
ad space. He was proud he had incorporated advertising’s “dynamic abilities” into the 
“war-machinery of government.”53 He believed the exercise in cooperation helped to 
legitimize advertiser’s existence and gave them the “dignity of a profession.”54 
Creel’s regard for advertising spurred greater professionalization of the advertising 
industry, and supplied a key argument for its importance after the war had ended. 





After WWI, advertising devoted less ad space to text and more to images, just as 
professional advertising literature shifted from “seeing human nature as rational to 
seeing human nature as emotional.”55 One historian reports that, advertisements 
based on logical appeal decreased from 62 percent in the 1900s to 35.5 percent i
1930s.
n the 
                                                
56 Where prose had been more adapted to logic; pictures spoke the language of 
emotion.57 For consumers who were already feeling powerless against a backdrop of 
post-war depression and uncontrolled wartime inflation, decreased ad copy meant less 
 
52 Creel, 4. 
53 Ibid, 157. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Michael Schudson, Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious Impact on American Society 
(New York: Basic Books, 1984), 59. 
56 Inger Stole, Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public Relations in the 1930s 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 22. 
57 Marchand, 154. 
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information, and a diminished ability to compare products and get the most value for 
their money. Wages that had been unable to keep up with high prices led to wide 
spread preoccupation in the 1920s on consumer purchasing power, contentious labor 
disputes over wages and newly found consumer consciousness. Politicians who had 
labeled big business as wartime profiteers fueled the working-class consumer’s ire 
and the growth of grassroots consumer organization. Fair Price Committees, 
comprised primarily of women, formed to report “excessive” pricing by merchants 
and to call attention to unfair economics of capitalism. The idea of underconsumption 
became accepted, even among politicians, who started to study the issue of 
purchasing power and how to increase it. Instead of increasing wages, businessmen 
relied on new advertising techniques to ensure demand for their products. Advertising 
for brand-name products, for example, exploded during the 1920s, which failed to 
inform or overtly misinformed consumers about the value of their product. Other 
advertising trends preyed on consumer’s insecurities by devising ailments, like 
“halitosis,” for which consumers would feel compelled to purchase a brand-name 
mouthwash. By deploying marketing research, advertisers surveyed consumers “to 
analyze their buying habits and the effectiveness of advertising,” and to become 
better persuaders.58 When new advertising methods were combined with a lack of 
standardized weights and product materials, consumers were left feeling defenseless 
in the marketplace. In 1927, Stuart Chase, of the Labor Bureau, and F.J. Schlink, of 
the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Standards, teamed up to call attention to 
                                                 
58 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donell, Propaganda and Persuasion. (3d ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1999), 165. 
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the consumer buying “blindly” and “chaotically.”59 Their best-selling book, Your 
Money’s Worth, exposed manipulation and fraud of manufacturers and argued for 
consumer access to the same product information that the government had access 
to.60 The book “crystallized a vaguely felt, but widespread, discontent,”61 am
consumers and set the stage for a consumer’s movement and rising consumer 
consciousness throughout the thirties.  
ong 
                                                
While messages in commercial advertising used people’s insecurities to 
encourage consumption, President Roosevelt used popular media to reassure the 
public and to promote economic stability. Once elected, he began implementing his 
New Deal programs and used advertising techniques to publicize them. In addition to 
use of radio technology, made famous by his reassuring fireside chats, some of his 
programs had their own logos and publicity campaigns. The National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) had a goodwill trademark, the Blue Eagle logo, designed by 
the art director of the A.J. Ayer agency (fig. 45).62 Displaying the Blue Eagle poster 
or placard in a window, or printing the logo mark on receipts, labels and ads, was a 
way for businesses to show they agreed to policies enacted to create employment and 
increase purchasing power. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), 
established to restore a better balance between farm prices and industrial prices, paid 
farmers to reduce production. In response to reports of farmers destroying good food 
and land, and to public skepticism of this policy, a colorful AAA poster showed an 
illustration of a healthy family standing in front of toiling, industrious farmers 
 
59 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 89. 
60 Stole, 23. 




between the words, “America has Plenty of Food for Everyone” (fig. 46). In 1936, 
The Plow that Broke the Plains was the first film produced by the United States 
Government for commercial distribution and, “the most widely publicized attempt by 
the federal government to communicate to its entire citizenry through a motion 
picture.”63 Through documentary film, the director Pare Lorentz justified New Deal 
programs like the U.S. Resettlement Administration, which aided families devastated 
by natural disaster. The film showed heroic farmers who patriotically, yet 
inadvertently, stripped the prairie of grass in order to answer calls for increased wheat 
production during WWI (fig. 47). Lorentz had wanted to supply an explanation for 
the Dust Bowl, to encourage audience sympathy, and to help New Deal programs 
resist accusations of supplying hand-outs to undeserving sectors of society. His film 
combined a musical score, based on recognizable hymns, with documentary-like 
narration and imagery to unabashedly appeal to the public’s emotions.  
Figure 45 
NRA Blue Eagle Emblem and poster 
displayed in restaurant window stating 
their participation and support for 
government program, c. 1934. 
Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 
Public Domain Photographs, 1882 – 
1962, NARA ARC Identifier: 512587. 
Figure 46 
America has Plenty of 
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Figure 47 
Still from The Plow that Broke the Plains (1936), produced and shown by the Farm Security Administration 
(which absorbed the Resettlement Administration).  




 “World War II came at a favorable time for building unity by visual means,” 
asserts George Roeder.64 Americans readily participated in “a communal viewing 
experience” that included movies, Life magazine, newsreels, and New Deal 
propaganda.65 Documentary photography appeared regularly in newspapers and 
newsreels, and in the photojournalism of Life, and taught viewers to equate 
photography with truth. A George Gallup poll of 40,000 newspaper readers in the 
1930s revealed that “pages with pictures commanded greater reader attention.” 66 
Advertisers sponsored more surveying and polling, and increased their use of images 
in ads. Images helped advertisers create the reality they wanted their audiences to 
believe. According to advertising historian Roland Marchand,  
The very ambiguity of the relationship between things-as-they-are and things-as-
we-like-to-fantasize-them was the quality that came increasingly to endear the 
photograph to advertising…. The photograph did not provoke the viewer to 
conjure up an image  
of the photographer who devised it. Rather, it encouraged the viewer to remain 
                                                 
64 Roeder, 4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Marvin Heiferman, “Everywhere, All the Time, for Everybody,” in Image World (New York: 
Whitney Museum of American Art, 1989), 24. 
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unconscious of any intervening, manipulative creator and to experience the 
voyeur’s sense of directly glimpsing the world’s reality.67 
  
 From the advertiser’s perspective, realistic imagery inspired belief and discouraged 
“psychological resistance.” People believe what they see.68 In 1942, the vice 
president of Young & Rubican advertising agency, and chairman of the Ad Council, 
conducted a survey to establish conventions of effective war poster design. The re
was a pamphlet, “How to Make Posters that Will Win the War,” created for OWI 





                                                
Anyone whose job it is to select war posters can be sure of getting only the most effective 
posters  
by asking two simple questions: 
 
Does the poster appeal to emotions? 
Is the poster a literal picture in photographic detail? 
 
The most effective posters appeal to emotions. No matter how beautiful the artwork, how 
striking  
the colors, how clever the idea, unless a war poster appeals to basic human emotions in both 
picture  
and text, it is not likely to make a deep impression. 
The poster should be a picture, not an all-type poster or symbolic design. And by a picture is 
meant a true and literal representation, in photographic detail of people and objects as they 
are, and as they look for millions of average people who make up the bulk of the population 
of the United States. 
If it isn’t a picture, it is not likely to make a powerful appeal. 
 
Consumers in the 1920s and 30s had felt the impact of advertising’s trend 
toward emotional appeals when attempting to comparison shop, but what was the 
impact of this shift in style on war messages? The OWI poster in figure 12 targeted a 
similar audience with a similar message as the WWI poster in figure 11, but used a 
fifth of the verbiage (56 words compared to 11 words) to encourage women to carry 
 
67 Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity 1920-1940 
(Berkeley: UC Press, 1985), 152-3. 
68 Marchand, 154. 
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their packages. To understand the simplified, more assertive and enthusiastic, “I’ll 
carry mine too!” the viewer had to see the poster’s image and fill in its intended 
meanings. The earlier poster used the linguistic-only appeal, “Release men and 
equipment for war service” and “Make the parcel in the hand a badge of honor” to 
connect the men needed for duty and the pride a woman could feel when seen 
carrying her own parcels. According to the text, a woman’s decision to carry her own 
parcels could have symbolized her support of fighting men at war, but it could not 
have symbolically duplicated the soldiers’ actions on distant battlefields. This implied 
connection — and the additional, emotional motivation to act — became a possibility 
in the second poster through its use of images.  
Much like ads that offered the consumer something “better,” and insisted the 
option was yours to make, the message in the second poster was carefully crafted to 
encourage the audience to make the “right” choice themselves. On one level, to have 
emulated behavior depicted in a poster, was to have aligned with the belief promoted 
by the Director of OWI during his special radio broadcast in 1942: “This country was 
organized on the principle that if the American people understood what was going on, 
and what had to be done in their own best interest, they would do it.”69 Instead of 
asking for sacrifice, figure 12’s first-person, highly affirmative text “I’ll carry mine 
too!” and the directness of the woman’s gaze showed how her “parcel in the hand” 
was not a burden, but a source of pride — her symbolic badge of honor for her action 
and her attitude. According to the image, her action then became a visible signal to 
others that she would carry her own parcels, and do what was necessary, much like 
                                                 
69 Elmer Holmes Davis, National Address, Food Rationing and the War: An Address by Mr. Elmer 
Davis on  27 December 1942. (1942; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of War Information, 1943). 
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the soldiers depicted behind her, or the “too” with whom she is aligning in the “I’ll 
carry mine too” statement. Her action echoed theirs, as did her honorable 
volunteerism.  
As the posters from WWII show, advertisers had learned that reason need not 
be emphasized when addressing a mass audience, and in fact, it should probably be 
disguised, without appearing so, wherever possible. Images helped serve this purpose, 
and by the 1940s, ad men were convinced that pictures relayed their messages better 
than copy. One ad executive decided, “The eye gets the facts quicker and more 
graphically than the mind.”70 The earlier, “reason-why” posters from WWI referred 
directly to a time of war, famine and sacrifice, but in the WWII posters, war and 
somber calls to duty had been replaced, to paraphrase Roland Barthes, with a “blissful 
clarity” that is not an explanation or a rationalization of complicated facts, or in this 
case, of global events. The WWII posters provided a clarity that comes not with 
questions, but with images’ statements of fact, and showed a world “wallowing in the 
evident.”71 To “sell the war,” advertisers had argued, the government needed 
messages designed not for thinking, but for acting. Communication theory suggests 
that the image-based messages presented an ‘uncoded,’ or naturalistic representation 
and “specific, authoritatively prescribed way[s]” of understanding them.72 Barthes 
explains that images “are more imperative than writing, they impose meaning at one 
                                                 
70 Marchand, 154. 
71 Barthes, Mythologies, Trans. Annette Lavers. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 143. 
72 Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, “Reading Images,” in Paul Cobley, ed., The Communication 
Theory Reader (London: Routledge, 1996), 174. 
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stroke, without analyzing or diluting it.”73 Or as Charles Kettering of General Motors 
put it:  “The fewer words an advertisement contains, the better it will be.”74 
When George Creel claimed he had wanted to educate the public and to 
“reach people through their minds, rather than through their emotions,”75 his analogy 
between advertising and WWI government propaganda, fit the period’s “reason-why” 
style of advertising. When his WWII successor, OWI’s Elmer Davis, a respected 
news reporter, described his agency’s intentions similarly, the uses of emotional 
appeals by the Ad Council appear at odds with the goals of OWI. Davis’s 
commitment to facts about the war effort, evident in his slogan, “This is a people's 
war, and the people are entitled to know as much as possible about it,” contradicted 
the advertisers’ often cheery, ad-like eagerness to push post-war expectations for 
renewed free-market consumerism. The Ad Council claimed to believe in an 
informed public, but their idea of educational war information looked like ads of the 
day: “bland and inoffensive…a selective reality of sacrifice and struggle exorcised of 
troublesome detail.”76 As one art director explained, Business desires to “create an 
attitude about the facts, not communicate them. And only about some of the facts…to 
say as little as necessary in the most impressive way.”77 Thus, the business-minded 
approach to informing the public rarely reflected, and at times obfuscated, the public 
servant’s or journalist’s idea of an informed public. 
                                                 
73 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, 110. 
74 Chares Kettering quoted by Marchand, 154. 
75Marchand, 4, 116. 
76 William L. Bird and Harry R. Rubenstein, Design for Victory: World War II Posters on the 
American Home Front (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 48. 
77 William Golden quoted by Cipe Pineles Golden, Kurt Weihs, and Robert Strunsky, eds., The Visual 
Craft of William Golden (New York: George Braziller, 1962), 61. 
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Roosevelt and OPA had stressed fairness for all consumers as a way to quell 
fears over mandatory food rationing, which the Ad Council saw as an opportunity to 
reinforce individual gain in the marketplace. Posters often depicted citizens, usually 
women, as shoppers in scenes that existed completely within the framework a 
consumer situation. Communal responsibility and voluntary effort emphasized in 
WWI and in New Deal propaganda had been replaced by an emphasis on getting 
one’s “fair share.” The woman in figure 12 for example, did not just demonstrate 
patriotic parcel-carrying behavior, she also displayed business-friendly shopping 
behavior. The audience most likely to have related to the woman depicted probably 
looked like her, or aspired to emulate the lifestyle of women who did: married white 
women who dressed well enough to identify as at least middle class, and who could 
afford to fill her arms with purchased goods. Another WWII poster used a before-
and-after illustration of two scenes in a grocery store to show how rationing meant “a 
fair share for all of us.” At first, one woman is shown leaving the store with an entire 
box of food while another is left empty handed, to the dismay of her and the 
shopkeeper, then, with rationing, a smiling shopkeeper is able to hand the same 
amount of a product to both women (fig. 48). With rationing, the poster claimed, 
more women were given the opportunity to procure goods successfully and thus, to 
avoid disappointment and experience happiness. Other publicity materials, like price 
lists, were designed specifically for placement within store settings (fig. 49). Posters 
created especially for butcher shops reminded housewives they could exchange used 
fats for two ration points (fig. 50). Another shopping-related poster depicted a 
shopkeeper pointing patronizingly to a Home Front Pledge poster of a woman with 
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her hand raised. To the women whom the poster assumes must have been hassling the 
shopkeeper, it claimed defensively, “WE ARE COOPERATING With the 15,000,000 
women who are keeping the HOMEFRONT PLEDGE” (fig. 51). Thanks to 
mandatory rationing, fear of black marketeering and the women who dutifully 
checked ceiling prices and managed ration points, a hyper-focus on consumer 
purchasing power continued throughout WWII. When combined with an image’s 
ability to convey multiple meanings, WWII posters depicted the desire for goods and 
the act of shopping as proper, patriotic behavior. Poster art enabled the Ad Council to 
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Some OWI employees, who worked alongside members of the Ad Council, 
understood their job to inform the public differently from the admen. This led to a 
clash over poster designs: some felt dedicated to promoting war aims with serious, 
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informative war messages, while others championed the effectiveness of modern 
advertising techniques. This disagreement led to internal conflicts based on rival 
ideologies, and to the 1943 resignation of a large group of OWI writers and the 
Graphics Bureau chief, Francis Brennan. In his resignation letter, Brennan agreed that 
some advertising techniques, like printing and distribution were valuable, 
But if you mean psychological approaches, content and ideas, I most firmly do not 
agree.  
In my opinion those techniques have done more toward dimming perceptions, 
suspending  
critical values, and spreading the sticky syrup of complacency over the people more 
than  
any other factor in the complex pattern of our supercharged lives.78   
 
The writers, too, claimed the admen “tended to discourage material 
emphasizing the grimmer side of war,” and felt strongly that they could not work for 
“high pressure promoters who prefer slick salesmanship to honest information.”79 
The writing staff included established journalists and writers hand-picked for 
intelligence and integrity, and were described by one historian as “one of the most 
erudite groups in Washington.”80 They shared a conviction that their most urgent task 
was to inform Americans as much as possible about the war and had been given 
freedom to write pamphlets on any topic they chose. Shortly after a publication ready 
for printing was cancelled against their wishes, and an internal OWI consolidation lef
them working directly under a former vice-president of Columbia Broadcasting 
t 
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System and a former vice-president of Coca-Cola, fifteen writers and researchers 
resigned en masse from their OWI positions.81 One the writers, Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., explained his decision to resign by describing an intellectual and ideological shif
in OWI that he viewed as 
 
t 
a power grab:  
                                                
The advertising men have been striking out for more and more power over 
the whole domestic information policy. This has meant a primary interest in 
manipulating the people, not in giving them the facts. It has meant an 
increasing conviction that any government information campaign likely to 
affect a vested business interest should first be approved by that interest. It 
has meant a steady replacement of independent writers, newspapermen, 
publishers, mostly of liberal inclination, by men beholden to the business 
community for their livelihood and thinking always as the business 
community thinks. 
 
Similarly appalled by the new bosses’ preference for superficial advertising imagery, 
and how they “treated the American people as if they were twelve years old,” Francis 
Brennan and artist Ben Shahn created a poster that they believed suited the office’s 
new outlook. They depicted “the Statue of Liberty, arm upraised, carrying not a torch, 
but four frosty bottles of Coca-Cola…with a motto ‘The War That Refreshes: The 
Four Delicious Freedoms!’ ”82 One advertising executive chalked up “the hullabaloo 
made by the resigning writers” to confusion over OWI policies, and defended the role 
of advertisers by equating their persuasive abilities to the Church: 
In the president’s directive setting up this agency, the word “propaganda” does not 
appear. It is technically an “information” agency…But the fact is that the home front 
needs propaganda. Not in the sense of deceit, as its opponents use the word; but in 
the original sense, as used by the Church, for the Propagation of the Faith. Elmer 
Davis wavers between his rightful dislike of propaganda in the deceit sense, and his 
somewhat dim awareness of its need in the Faith sense.83 
 
 
81 Ibid., 85-86. 
82 Ibid. 
83 James Webb Young, The Diary of an Ad Man: The War Years June 1, 1942-December 31, 1943 
(Chicago: Advertising Publications, Inc., 1944), 144. 
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These accounts of the behind-the-scenes episode known as The Writer’s Quarrel 
substantiate what the posters made visible: that the Ad Council brought distinct 
ideologies with them to their war work. The myths of homefront America depicted in 
their posters were just one way of viewing and depicting the American public, albeit a 
heavily marketed one. 
There was no shortage of commercial advertising outside of OWI’s 
publications, either. Private companies continued to advertise during the war to align 
a company or industry with the war effort and to improve their image. Many 
businesses adopted a self-congratulatory stance, and hoped to take advantage of the 
good will of patriotic fervor. Materials produced by the National Association of Food 
Chains in 1942, to help promote the national nutrition plan, included their own logo 
linking “producer,” “chain store” and “consumer,” along with the slogans, “Better 
living at Lower Cost” and “Cooperation — The American Way” (fig. 52). The logo 
suggested a commitment to lower prices and a cooperative relationship between the 
three actors that had been lacking in the preceding decades. The National Cotton 
Council of America developed a series of posters (fig. 53) to announce “factoids” of 
cotton’s usefulness in the war effort, including, “A soldier in the best fed army of the 
world consumes slightly more than 4 1/2 pounds of food daily, of which about  3 1/2 
pounds moves in cotton bags!” In a poster titled “Camouflaged Angels,” the Cotton 
Council informed a homefront audience that nurses in tropical combat areas wore 
cotton seersucker uniforms, which blended in with the jungle background, “yet still 
retain[ed] a crisp and neat appearance!” (fig. 53). Other industries gained permission 
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to incorporate government logos for national food campaigns directly into their ads.84 
Consumers were left to wonder if the company was endorsing the national nutrition 
campaign or if the government endorsing the product. Levenstein writes that large 
companies agreed to help spread messages about nutrition, but did so in ways that 
distorted the government’s messages to highlight the importance of their own 
products.85 In their own series of magazine ads, the American Gas Industry declared 
itself “the wonder fuel for cooking,” and integral to “victory cooking” as called for by 
the government’s nutrition program (fig. 54). The American Meat Institute prepared a 
series of ready-to-print “Wartime Meat Recipes” for newspapers and local butcher 
shops to run at will, including the pork recipes in figure 55 and the logo that mimic 
one of the government’s. And in 1942, Borden sponsored a short documentary film 
about the production of milk titled, “White Ammunition.” In the film, the 
wholesomeness of milk — a topic typically reserved for home economics classes — 
was transformed into a substance central to national defense. The male narrator 
described the bottles in the automated filling machine as “an army of glass soldiers 
lining up…to receive their quota of white ammunition” (fig. 56). These promotional 
efforts represented an intentional muddling of advertising, wartime propaganda and 
entertainment, which many feared did little to inform the public and instead, 
encouraged the public to become more reliant on the manipulation of images and 
symbols.86 
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The National Agriculture Library’s collection of wartime posters and other publicity 
reveals the attempts to persuade a mass homefront audience to change their behavior. 
By making visible the agendas behind the government sponsored messages, posters 
are evidence of the bias often present in mass communication. A broad view, 
including a comparison of WWI posters with WWII posters, highlights important 
changes in the methods used to persuade, and in the advertising industry trusted by 
the US government to deliver those messages. The Ad Council produced messages 
and frameworks that supported a consumption- and advertising-friendly atmosphere. 
Advertising’s messages did not reflect reality, but an idealized version of it intended 
to elicit desire and to promote the habits of consumerism, on which their industry 
relied. A cooperative partnership with the Ad Council, offered private interests 
opportunities to influence public messages about idealized behavior, while operating 
within a government-endorsed capacity.  
Advertising cultivates desires and needs, writes Michael Schudson, including, 
“freedom, fulfillment, and personal transformation,” which materialistic consumption 
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can never fulfill.87 Cultural observers lament that citizens are rarely reminded of this 
fact in popular culture, and worry about commercial interests turning consumption 
into a substitute for democracy, where choices presented to the consumer take the 
place of meaningful political choice, and serve to “mask and compensate for all that 
is undemocratic within society.”88 The National Agriculture Library’s poster 
collection provides an opportunity to consider the source and ambitions of public 
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